Page 20 - Geopolítica del Mundo Actual. Una Visión Multidisciplinar

GEOPOLÍTICA DEL MUNDO ACTUAL. UNA VISIÓN MULTIDISCIPLINAR:
Cultura de Paz, Conflictos, Educación y Derechos Humanos
privileges to attract local leaders in Hong Kong), stick (repression in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia), and normative (Taiwan) policies. China works as a super- nation trying to accommodate with nationality policies similar to Soviet efforts. And with the same weakness: nations want to decide themselves.
The power profile differs among the five cases, and over time. A war over Hong Kong with the UK was avoided, a war over Taiwan with the US may still be avoided, but also may not. Military brutality in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang may be stepped up, but the Chinese military can also be brutal in han contexts. The more foreign, barbarian powers side with a movement, the more recalcitrant the Chinese. The location of the Tibetan exile government in an India with nuclear weapons, and the deepening linkage between Taiwan and the US-Japan security system counteract reasonable outcomes. Vicious short and long cycles of minor violencies are likely.
[3] Therapy.
An acceptable, sustainable outcome will go beyond the extremist positions of a Chinese unitary state (with the present borders + Taiwan, the “run-away province”) versus secession from that unitary state. In-between are the classics: devolution, federation and the looser confederation; outcomes not located in the Chinese past, but coming up frequently in dialogues with the parties. Autonomy in domestic affairs would be guaranteed. In federations foreign- security- finance policies would be common; in confederations they would be coordinated, but with autonomy. One scenario might be federation first, confederation later; the five advancing in step or separately. The underlying philosophy from Chinese culture is daoist: in strength weakness, in weakness strength. Force shows the weakness of the construction, and stronger constructions can do without force. The hurdles to be overcome are considerable.
First, the han mind-set as undisputed rulers between Himalayas, the desert, the tundra and the sea. Will the Chinese be convinced that a looser configuration of Six Chinas might be in their interest?
Second, will those who seek independence find that their goals may be better satisfied in a configuration that offers enormous economies of scale and a cultural common ground; yet (in a confederation) offers military-political independence?
Third: will all parties agree that time has come to solve these old Chinese problems jointly, not separately?
Fourth: how to protect Chinese in the new republics? Separate assemblies?
Tibetans may have to admit that lamaism was brutal, and that China also has positive aspects. This is easier for Taiwan, being itself so Chinese. Beijing and Taipeh would both have to give up the idea of being the center of the other, finding confederal equality; with Beijing somewhat more equal than the others. (972)
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